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THE JUDICIAL TREND TOWARD STUDENT 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
WILLIAM w. VAN ALSTYNE* 
The law that governs the prerogatives of college students and the powers 
of universities consists of rising tiers of authority. From ad hoc adminis-
trative and faculty rules, the layers progress upward to the supreme law of 
the Constitution. This brief discussion, however, concerns only one part of 
this uppermost tier- the fourteenth amendment (plus portions of the Bill 
of Rights to the extent they have been absorbed into the fourteenth amend-
ment and made applicable to publicly-supported colleges). Additionally, not 
even all of the fourteenth amendment shall be considered, but only two of its 
several clauses in the first of its five sections. 
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
Virtually every significant change affecting student prerogatives and college 
powers made within the past ten years has resulted from an authoritative 
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, a fairly responsible 
review of trends in the law of student prerogatives and college powers may 
confine itself to an examination of judicial trends under the fourteenth 
amendment and the Bill of Rights. 
The fourteenth amendment is, of course, only a limitation on college 
power. That is, college rules do not derive their authority from the four-
teenth amendment, and no college need show that its rule-making power is 
authorized by the fourteenth amendment.1 The point is mild and self-evident, 
but extremely important; those who would seek to displace or invalidate a 
college rule by reliance upon the fourteenth amendment must sustain the 
burden of showing in what manner a given college rule or action is forbidden 
by or conflicts with the ultimate norms of the fourteenth amendment. 
Still another preliminary observation needs to be made in narrowing the 
field of our discussion. The amendment provides only that no "State" shall 
deny due process or equal protection. Thus, while state colleges and state 
universities are readily subject to its strictures the amendment would not ap-
pear to address itself to private colleges and universities. These, it may be 
suggested, can operate freely without observing due process or equal protec-
tion. In this sense, the fourteenth amendment does not establish a "right" to 
due process or to equal protection; rather, it merely provides a limited "im-
munity" - an immunity from state denials of due process or equal protection. 
•B.A., 1934, University of Southern California; LL.B. 1958, Stanford University; Cer-
tificate, 1961, The Hague Academy of International Law; Professor of Law, Duke University. 
I. The affirmative source of rule-making power is to be sought in articles of incorpora-
tion, charters, state delegation of legislative prerogatives, subdelegations by boards of trus-
tees, et cetera. 
[290] 
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In a larger and highly practical way, however, this preliminary observa-
tion is substantially false and our discussion is in fact relevant to many 
colleges that regard themselves as private institutions. The concept of "state 
action" has so far expanded, and the presence of government has so far pene-
trated, that very few colleges are today wholly "private" in the sense of being 
altogether immune to the fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights (the 
latter applying to instrumentalities of the federal government and thus, to a 
variable extent, to colleges with substantial federal involvements). The ma-
jority of new college building programs even at "private" colleges are cur-
rently underwritten by federal loans and insurance. Large numbers of fellow-
ships, scholarships, and loans at "private" colleges ru;e supplied with federal 
money. Government research contracts represent a rapidly growing per-
centage of college budgets, and local, state, and federal tax-exempt status 
indirectly aid most colleges. As a consequence, the following dictum by the 
Supreme Court becomes significant: 2 
[W]hen authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the 
scales, the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely 
akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government itself. 
Additionally, education itself has become increasingly regarded as a "public 
function," just as a larger percentage of students currently attend publicly-
supported institutions than ever before. We can no longer ignore the com-
plex of federal court decisions that brings colleges and universities within 
range of the fourteenth amendment.8 These decisions equally emphasize the 
2. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950). 
3. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 
(1966) (quasi-public nature of park plus continuation of some maintenance brings private 
trustees of the park under the equal protection clause); Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (privately-operated restaurant under arms-length lease 
with public parking authority subject to equal protection clause. "Only by sifting facts and 
weighing circumstances can the non-obvious involvement of the State in private conduct be 
attributed its true significance."); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (county-wide 
private association's preprimary elections held subject to fifteenth amendment. "For a 
state to permit such a duplication of its election processes is to permit a flagrant abuse 
of those processes."); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (mere state judicial en-
forcement of racially restrictive private property covenant violates equal protection clause. 
"Nor is the Amendment ineffective simply because the particular pattern of discrimination 
which the State has enforced, was defined initially by the terms of a private agreement."); 
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (privately-owned company town subject to 
first amendment. "We do not agree that the corporation's property interests settle the 
question. • • . The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by 
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and 
constitutional rights of those who use it."); Eaton v. Grubb, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964) 
(private hospital receiving federal aid and performing "public function" subject to fourteenth 
amendment); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa.), afl'd, 
373 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967) (orphans' school operated by private trustees but subject to some 
state regulation held subject to fourteenth amendment); Guillory v. Tulane Univ., 203 F. 
Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962) (private university with state charter, some tax exemption, and 
three public officials nominally on governing board subject to fourteenth amendment); Cf. 
Green v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 6ll (D.D.C. 1967). The Green case is of doubtful 
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"significant involvement" of government in formerly private educational 
enterprises and the "public function" of education itself. It is important there-
fore, to note that many more colleges may be bound by constitutional norms 
than are commonly regarded as being so bound. The subject having now been 
put in focus, we move to an examination of recent judicial trends. 
GENERAL TRENDS RESPECTING STUDENT STATUS 
In 1925, the Florida Supreme Court reflected the perspective of courts 
across the country in generously deferring to the autonomy and supposed 
expertise of college administrations. In reversing a judgment secured against 
Stetson University and its president by a girl indefinitely suspended following 
a brief interrogation by the president who rather summarily determined that 
the girl had created disturbances in a dormitory, the court observed: 4 
As to mental training, moral and physical discipline, and welfare of 
the pupils, college authorities stand in loco parentis and in their dis-
cretion may make any regulation for their government which a parent 
could make for the same purpose . . . . 
[In the case of a private institution,] it is not incumbent on the insti-
tution to prefer charges and prove them at trial before dismissing per-
manently or temporarily a student regarded by it as undesirable. 
An increasing number of state and federal courts have modified this 
perspective substantially since 1961. The analogy of in loco pa,-entis has been 
rejected, the importance of a student's interest in his academic status has 
been upgraded, the definition of a "private" institution has been narrowed, 
and the role of constitutional limitations has been expanded. Reviewing 
recent federal court decisions last year, a California court of appeals observed: 5 
The more recent federal cases stress the importance of education 
to the individual and conclude that attendance in a state university 
is no longer considered a privilege . . . . but is now regarded as an 
important benefit .... 
In the Dixon and Knight cases, it was held that procedural due 
process required a hearing before students who participated in demon-
strations violating laws concerning the separation of the races in public 
places could be dismissed or suspended from the state university. As 
authority for any of its asserted propositions in view of the fact that the court of appeals 
ordered reinstatement of the ousted students pending a hearing on he merits, subject to the 
holding of an orderly hearing within the college.); Green v. Howard Univ., Civil No. 1949 
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Parsons College v. North Central Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 271 
F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 212 F. Supp. 674 
(E.D. La. 1962); University of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701, 704 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 
1966). See also A. S. MILLER, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVATE EDUCATION (1957); Van 
Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 28-36 (1961); Note, Private Government 
on the Campus- Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963); Com-
ment, Racial Discrimination in "Private" Schools, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 39 (1967). 
4. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640 (1925). 
5. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 469 (Cal. App. 1967) (empha-
sis added). 
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stated in Dixon: "The precise nature of the private · interest in-
volved in this case is the right to remain at a public institution of 
higher learning in which the plaintiffs were students in good standing. 
It requires no argument to demonstrate that education is vital and 
indeed, basic to civilized society. Without sufficient education the 
plaintiffs would not be able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy 
life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and 
responsibilities of good citizens." The court noted in Knight that: 
"Whether the interest involved be described as a right or a privilege, 
the fact remains that it is an interest of almost incalculable value, es-
pecially to those students who have already enrolled in the institution 
and begun the pursuit of their college training. Private interests are 
to be evaluated under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, not in terms of labels or fictions, but in terms of their true sig-
nificance and worth." 
For constitutional purposes, the better approach, as indicated in 
Dixon, recognizes that state universities should no longer stand in loco 
parentis in relation to thei1· students. 
293 
The Dixon case r~ferred to in the California opm10n, incidentally, is a 
decision from the federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which has 
appellate jurisdiction over federal cases and controversies arising in the south-
east, including Florida.6 
There is nothing especially startling in the judicial determination to up-
grade the students' claim in preserving their educational opportunity and 
nothing startling in applying the constitutional norms in behalf of persons 
under twenty-one years of age. In 1954, the Supreme Court observed: "In 
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed 
in life if he is denied the opportunity of a public education."7 
Similarly, those under twenty-one years of age, including even those in 
secondary schools, are not excepted from the protection of the fourteenth 
amendment. In voiding a compulsory flag salute as applied to school chil-
dren religiously opposed to such a state ceremony, Mr. Justice Jackson 
observed in 1943:8 
The Fou1·teenth Amendment, as now applied to the states, protects 
the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures- Boards of 
Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and 
highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform 
within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the 
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitu-
tional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free 
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles 
of our government as mere platitudes. 
6. The case is Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. 
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). 
7. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Today, education is perhaps 
the most important function of state and local governments."); cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 400 (1923) ("The American people have always regarded education and acqui-
sition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance."); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 634 (1819) ("That education is an object of national concern ... 
all admit."). 
8. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (emphasis added). 
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SPECIFIC JUDICIAL TRENDS 
Procedural Due Process9 
Even minors cannot be disciplined in a manner affecting their substantial 
interests without the observance of procedural due process. This proposition 
received fresh support from the Supreme Court only last year. In prospec-
tively requiring juvenile courts to improve the judicial nature of their 
proceedings, the Court declared:10 
Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of 
individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social 
compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the 
powers which the state may exercise. 
In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not 
require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in 
the phrase "due process." Under our Constitution, the condition of 
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court. 
The jettisoning of in loco parentis was, it may be suggested, long overdue 
in any case. For one thing, the mean age of American college students is 
more than twenty-one years and there are, in fact, more students over the 
age of thirty than younger than the age of eighteen.11 Even in Blackstone's 
time, the doctrine did not apply to persons over twenty-one.12 For another 
thing, it is unrealistic to assume that relatively impersonal and large-scale 
institutions can act in each case with the same degree of solicitous concern 
as a parent reflects in the intimacy of his own home. The parent is doubtless 
restrained in tempering discipline with parental love and concern. The in-
stitution, however, cannot hope to reflect the same intense degree of emotional 
identification with those in attendance, no matter how well it may intend 
otherwise. The institution is also subject to different practical concerns- to 
keep its eye on reaction by the local press, disgruntlement among alumni, dis-
9. Further discussion of this subject can be found in Johnson, The Constitutional Rights 
of College Students, 42 TEXAs L. REv. 344 (1964); Moneypenny, University Purpose, Disci-
pline and Due Process, 43 N.D.L. REv. 739 (1967); Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due 
Process," 70 HARV. L. REv. 1406 (1957); Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State 
University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 368 (1968); Note, Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. 
L. REv. 1045, Il28 et seq. (1968); Note, Expulsion of College and Professional Students-
Rights and Remedies, 38 NoTRE DAME LAw. 174 (1963); Note, College Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings, 18 VAND. L. REv. 819 (1965); Note, Private Government on the Campus- Judicial 
Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963); Comment, School Expulsions 
and Due Process, 14 KAN. L. REv. 108 (1965); Comment, The Constitutional Rights of 
Students, 40 PHIL. L.J. 587 (1966); Comment, The College Student and Due Process in 
Disciplinary Proceedings, 13 S.D.L. REv. 87 (1968). 
10. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 19-20, 27-28 (1967). 
II. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dep't of Commerce, Current Population Reports, 
Population Characteristics, ser. P-20, No. IIO, at 12 (1961). 
12. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 782-84 (8th ed. 1890). 
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satisfaction among benefactors and others whose practical influences combine 
to bring about an administrative perspective less loving and more divided 
than a mother has for her own son or daughter. It simply blinks at reality 
to treat the mother and the college as one and the same in drawing legal 
analogies, no matter how frequently one refers to his alma mater for other 
purposes. Finally, a parent's disciplinary authority does not extend to the 
power literally to expel a dependent minor from his own home, but to lesser 
penalties only. Yet, the typical sanction imposed by the alleged surrogate 
parent, a college, is the sanction of expulsion itself- with all the serious 
consequences to the student's future already noted above. As the analogy of 
in loco parentis is several times false in fact, we need not be surprised nor 
alarmed that it is now being discarded. Large scale collegiate operations, the 
heterogeneity of their student bodies, the varying ages of their students, the 
irreducible impersonality of their operation, and the grave consequences of 
their disciplinary proceedings, all support the heightened requirements of 
greater procedural fair play in their treatment of alleged violators of their 
rules. 
The immediate, practical, and constitutional result of these phenomena 
is this: colleges and universities may no longer enforce their rules through 
sanctions seriously jeopardizing a student's career in the absence of pro-
cedures that are fundamentally fair. The essential elements of fair procedure 
include (but may not be limited to) the following requirements: 
(I). Serious disciplinary action may not be taken in the absence of 
published rules that: (a) are not "so vague that men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation;"18 and (b) do not depend upon the unqualified discretion of a 
particular administrator for their application.14 
(2). Where the rules are reasonably clear and their application does 
not depend upon uncontrolled discretion, a student still may not be 
seriously disciplined (as by suspension) unless: (a) the student charged 
with an infraction has been furnished with a written statement of the 
charge adequately in advance of a hearing to enable him to prepare his 
defense (for example, ten days);15 (b) the student thus charged "shall be 
permitted to inspect in advance of such hearing any affidavits or exhibits 
which the college intends to submit at the hearing";16 (c) the student is 
"permitted to have counsel present ... at the hearing to advise [him]";lT 
(d) the student is "permitted to hear the evidence presented against 
13. Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968). See also Elfbrandt v. Rus-
sell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Connally v. General 
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 
U.S. 233 (1925); Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967). 
But see Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968). 
14. Applied in Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 
1967). 
15. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W .D. Mo. 1967). 
16. Id. at 651. 
17. Id.; Madera v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), 
Tev'd on otheT grounds, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967); Goldwyn v. Allen, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 
(Sup. Ct. 1967). 
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him"18 or at least "the student should be given the names of witnesses 
against him and an oral or written report on the facts to which each 
witness testifies";19 (e) the student "(not his attorney) may question at 
the hearing any witness who gives evidence against him"; 20 (f) those who 
hear the case "shall determine the facts of each case solely on the evidence 
presented at the hearing .... ";21 (g) "the results and findings of the 
hearing should be presented in a report open to the student's inspection"; 22 
(h) "either side may, at its own expense, make a record of the events at 
the hearing."23 
These procedural safeguards roughly parallel some of the standards re-
quired of criminal courts in their disposition of offenses punishable by fine or 
short-term imprisonment. The comparison is not fortuitous because it is now 
evident that expulsion or exclusion from college may, in the long run, dis-
advantage an individual at least as much as a single infraction of a criminal 
statute. There should be no surprise, therefore, that students are entitled at 
least to the same degree of due process as a suspected pickpocket. Indeed, 
the requisites of due process still evolving from federal decisions are sub-
stantially less than standards already recommended by professional educational 
associations. The Association of American Colleges (representing adminis-
trations of nearly 900 colleges), The American Association of University Pro· 
fessors (representing about 86,000 full-time faculty at accredited institutions) , 
the National Student Association, the National Association of Student Per-
sonnel Administrators, the National Association of Women Deans and 
Counsellors, and the American Association of Higher Education have recently 
approved a Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, which goes 
considerably beyond the requirements suggested in court decisions.24 
18. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1967). 
19. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
368 u.s. 930 (1961). 
20. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 653 (W.D. Mo. 1967). 
21. I d. at 652. 
22. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. 
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). 
23. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1967). 
See also for particular treatments of these various requisites, ·woods v. 'Vright, 334 F.2d 
369 (5th Cir. 1964); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); 
Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966). See also the extraordinarily circum· 
spect procedure used by the University of California and approved by the state court in 
Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). Cf. the lesser standards 
held to be sufficient in Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Dunmar v. Ailes, 
348 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); 
Wright v. Texas So. Univ., 277 F. Supp. IIO (S.D. Texas 1967); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 
233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963). See also Butting v. Smily, No. C-666 (D. Colo. Feb. 2, 
1968) (opinion by Arraj, J.); Soglin v. Kauffman, No. 67·6-141 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 11, 1967) 
(opinion by Doyle, J.). 
24. See Appendix. See also the earlier ACLU statement, which the Joint Statement 
parallels, A.C.L.U. Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties of Students in Colleges and 
Universities (rev. cd. 1965). The University of California, Berkeley, appears to provide 
greater procedural safeguards that the Joint Statement. See REPORT OF THE STUDY COMliiiS· 
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The late (and judicially conservative) Mr. Justice Frankfurter once ob-
served that "[T]he history of liberty has largely been the history of observance 
of procedural safeguards."25 So it is with students, as with others. 
Somewhat anticlimactically, however, it is necessary to note a few additional 
matters in rendering out treatment of student procedural due process with 
fuller accuracy: 
(I). The federal cases involving procedural due process for students 
have been disposed of by courts below the level of the United States Su-
preme Court and thus their utterances on this subject are not necessarily 
the last word. Indeed, a number of federal courts disagree among them-
selves respecting the requisite degree of college due process.26 
(2). On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that additional safe-
guards may be imposed by the courts if it appears that complete fairness 
is still not being observed. For instance, it is foreseeable that random 
and unannounced searching of student rooms may be forbidden, that 
students may not be coerced into admissions of misdeeds, and that some 
greater degree of cross-sectional representation on hearing boards may 
eventually be required. 
(3). A clear distinction will probably continue to be made, however 
respecting campus offenses carrying such relatively insubstantial penalties 
(for example, social probation, minor fines, loss of auto privileges) that 
formal due process is not demanded and may well be dispensed with 
in the interest of administrative convenience. 
(4). A distinction will probably continue to be made in instances where 
students face the prospect of being dropped due to inadequate grades. 
It is true, of course, that dismissal for academic deficiency may be as 
serious to the student's educational career as dismissal for disciplinary 
reasons, but quasi-judicial procedures are generally inadequate as means 
of determining whether, for instance, an essay examination should have 
been graded as a "C" rather than a "D." A lay panel may ordinarily 
lack the competence of second-guessing grades. Only where the student's 
complaint alleges egregious and almost willfully biased grading may the 
college be required to provide some means of review, and even then the 
review would presumably involve a panel of professors familiar with the 
subject matter of the examination and who ·would follow a different 
procedure than in a disciplinary case.27 
(5). Finally, disciplinary proceedings are different from counselling 
proceedings where the student does not stand in jeopardy of a penalty.28 
So long as the counsellor is required to respect the confidentiality of his 
relationship and acts without power to impose punishment, no reason 
exists to import an adversary or quasi-judicial procedure that would under-
mine the counsellor's essential functions. 
SION ON UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE, THE CULTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY: GOVERNANCE AND EDU· 
CATION (1968). For similar institutional developments, see REPORT OF THE FAcULTY CoM-
MITTEE ON STUDENT AFFAIRS TO THE ACADEMIC COUNCIL, MICH. STATE UNIV., ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM FOR STUDENTS (1967); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF 
UNIVERSITY REGULATIONS AND LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL LAw (1967). 
25. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). See also Irwin v. Doud, 366 U.S. 
717, 729 (1961); similar statements by Frankfurter in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 
414 (1945). 
26. See cases cited note 23 supra. 
27. See, e.g., Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965). 
28. See, e.g., Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967); Cosme v. Board 
of Educ., 50 Misc. 2d 344, 270 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1966). . 
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Political Freedoms29 
Second only to their concern with procedural due process, an increasing 
number of courts have moved to circumscribe college power over political 
freedoms that are constitutionally reserved to all persons including students. 
There are two aspects of student political freedom that are especially topical 
just now: (1) rules that regulate forms of expression or political activity by 
the students themselves, on campus; (2) rules that regulate students in terms 
of whom they may invite to hear on campus. 
The first amendment explicitly provides protection for "freedom of 
speech, of the press," the right "peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances." This protection extends to those 
who are othenvise properly on a college or university campus, which is suf-
ficiently "public" to be subject to the first or fourteenth amendment. It 
operates as a limitation on college rule-making power to protect political ex-
pression and organizational activity by students, whether the subject of that 
expression is directed to alleged grievances within the college itself or whether 
the subject is an issue not especially related to the college itself. In order to 
withstand criticism anchored in a claim of constitutional right, college rules 
curtailing forms of political expression must generally satisfy the following 
standards: 
(1). They must be clear and specific, and free of such ambiguity that 
their uncertain scope and application are so doubtful as themselves to 
chill the exercise of orderly political expression; 30 
29. Further discussions of this subject can be found in Pollitt, Campus Censorship: 
Statutes Barring Speakers from State Educational Institutions, 42 N.C.L. REv. 179 (1963); 
Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 
lll U. PA. L. REv. 328 (1963); Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-
Making Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAw IN 
TRANSITION Q. I (1965); Note, Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, ll28 (1968); Note, 
State's Right To Abrogate First Amendment Guarantees in Regulation of State University 
Speaker Programs, 42 TULANE L. REv. 394 (1968); Note, Private Government on the Cam-
pus- Judicial Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963); Comment, Missis-
sippi's Campus Speaker Ban: Constitutional Considerations and the Academic Freedom of 
Students, 38 Miss. L. REv. 488 (1967). 
30. See cases cited note 13 supra. See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589 (1967) (faculty disclaimer oath void for vagueness); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 
195, 200 (1966) ("Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. When First 
Amendment rights are involved, we look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating 
conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press suffer."); 
Id. at 200 (footnotes omitted); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (faculty disclaimer 
oath void for vagueness); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (Florida 
teachers' oath void for vagueness); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 
695 (1959) (concurring opinion) ("The ultimate reason for invalidating such laws is that 
they lead to timidity and inertia and thereby discourage the boldness of expression in-
dispensable for a progressive society."). But see Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 
(M.D. Tenn. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. App. 1967). 
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(2). They must confine themselves to restrictions that go no further 
than to: (a) forbid modes of conduct that are manifestly unreasonable in 
terms of time, place, or manner;31 (b) forbid incitements made under 
such circumstances as to create a clear and present danger of precipitating 
a serious violation of law.s2 
Thus, a rule that broadly forbids "any student •.. [to engage on campus] 
in any public demonstrations without prior approval of the College adminis-
tration," is void on its face. It is a prior restraint devoid of proper standards 
restricting its application to assemblies held at a time, place, or in such a 
manner as to disrupt the school.33 Nor may a student editor be denied 
registration for "insubordination" in failing to submit totally to censorship of 
an editorial critical of the state legislature and for refusing to print in its 
stead a canned story about "Raising Dogs in North Carolina" as demanded 
by the college president.34 As the court declared in such a case:35 
A state cannot force a college student to forfeit his constitutionally 
protected right of freedom of expression as a condition to his attending 
a state-supported institution. State school officials cannot infringe on 
their students' right of free and unrestricted expression . . • where 
the exercise of such right does not "materially and substantially in-
terfere with requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation 
of the school." The defendants in this case cannot punish Gary Clinton 
Dickey for his exercise of this constitutionally guaranteed right by 
cloaking his expulsion or suspension in the robe of "insubordination." 
Similarly, students expressing a political view by wearing "freedom buttons" 
cannot be suspended on the pretense that such things must be forbidden 
to preserve discipline where in fact there has been no evidence of any physical 
disorder.36 
31. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (restriction on "raucous" volume 
from sound trucks in business district upheld); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 
(1942) (purely provocative epithets at captive listener may be forbidden); Cox v. New 
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (parade permit requirement upheld where issuance is 
mandatory and applicant need supply only minimum information); Blackwell v. Issaquena 
County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (intimidation of fellow students to join 
student protest may be forbidden); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 
(Cal. App. 1967) (noisy broadcast of obscene expressions in public on-campus places may 
be forbidden). Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (use of libel insuf-
ficient even for civil restraint in absence of actual malice and in context of political ex-
pression); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (possibility of litter insufficient to justify 
ban on political handbill distribution). 
32. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I (1949); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 
252 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schenck v. United States, 249 
u. s. 47 (1919). 
33. Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967). 
34. Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967). 
35. I d., at 618; Zander v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., Civ. Action No. 13,427 (W .D. 
La. March 8, 1968) (expulsion of students who seized control of facilities to demonstrate 
grievances upheld). 
36. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966). Cf. Blackwell v. Issaguena County 
Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 57 Cal. 
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Assemblies that are staged so as to congest access or passage, demonstrations 
that become disruptive because of their noise, and expression that is imposed 
on a semi-captive audience or offensively upon unwilling third parties, how-
ever, so clearly interfere with the reciprocal rights of others that they may 
appropriately be forbidden under regulations neutrally limiting even po-
litical expression according to reasonable time, place, and manner.37 Indeed, 
the administrative inconvenience of having to accommodate ad hoc demon-
strations in certain locations (for example, the president's office or inside a 
classroom building), may justify a rule placing some facilities entirely off 
limits as a political forum, even though a given demonstration might itself 
not happen to be disruptive.38 
One other point is also well established and presumably applies on cam-
puses as well. In regulating political expression, college authorities may not 
formulate or apply rules that discriminate against competing points of view. 
If placards or handbills favoring a given governmental policy may be dis-
tributed, a discriminatory ban on placards and handbills opposing that policy 
will fall as a denial of equal protection. If an assembly is permitted where 
students and faculty may comment on the evils of drug use, no curtain can be 
drawn on others holding an opposing view. In short, the publicly-supported 
college can no more engage in partisan censorship than government itself. 
The view of Mr. Justice Holmes has been accepted on this matter: 39 
[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accep-
ted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground 
upon which [our] wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is 
the theory of our Constitution. 
The constitutional law on this matter follows the observation of John Stuart 
Mill in his Essay on Liberty: 40 
Rptr. 463 (Cal. App. 1967); In re Bacon, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34 (Cal. App. 
1966). Burnside v. Byars was expressly not followed in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa 1966), afl'd by equally divided court, 
383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, ...... U.S ....... , 88 S. Ct. 1050 (1968) (ban on wearing 
black arm bands to protest Viet Nam policy upheld) and the two cases are well worth com-
paring. Burnside, a fifth circuit decision, is controlling in the southeastern United States. 
37. See cases cited note 21 supra. 
38. Cameron v. Johnson, 36 U.S.L.W. 4319 (U.S. April 22, 1968); Adderley v. 
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (trespass statute applied to curtilage of jailhouse against 
scarcely disruptive demonstrators upheld); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (dictum 
that demonstrations on courthouse steps may be wholly forbidden). But see Brown v. 
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (breach of peace conviction for quietly standing in 
anteroom of public library without evidence of interference with others and to pro-
test library segregation practices reversed). See also Jeanette Rankin Brigade v. Chief 
of Capitol Police, 278 F. Supp. 233 (1968), which is difficult to reconcile with Edwards v. 
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
39. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion). 
40. J- S. Mill, On Liberty, Representative Government, The Subjection of Women, in 
THE WoRLD'S CLASSICS (1966). 
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Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the 
very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of 
action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have 
any rational assurance of being right. 
It is in this context that the Supreme Court has suggested:41 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities 
is almost self-evident .... Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere 
of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain 
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherw·ise our civilization will stagnate and die. 
[E]ducation, if faithful to the ideal of secular instruction and political 
neutrality, will not be partisan or enemy of any class, creed, party, or 
faction. 
301 
Here again, however, the courts have provided no greater protection for 
students than that which has already been accepted by a significant number 
of educational associations. Thus, the Joint Statement on Student Rights and 
Freedoms provides: 
Students and student organizations should be free to examine and 
to discuss all questions of interest to them, and to express opinions 
publicly and privately. They should always be free to support causes 
by orderly means which do not disrupt the regular and essential opera-
tion of the institution. At the same time, it should be clear to the 
academic and the larger community that in their public expressions 
or demonstrations students or student organizations speak only for 
themselves. 
On the related political freedom - the rights of students to invite and to 
hear guest speakers on campus - the trend of judicial decision closely parallels 
the trend with respect to the students' own freedom of expression on campus. 
The courts have come to recognize that an individual cannot be made to 
relinquish those rights which he holds as a citizen (including the right to 
hear) as a condition of attending college. The college may generally regulate 
the appearance of invited guest speakers only to an . equivalent extent as 
may a civil polity regulate public facilities that are otherwise suitable as 
meeting places. It may establish neutral priorities (for example, giving 
preference to a regular academic event over an invitation to a guest speaker 
sought to be scheduled for the same time). It may require that sponsoring 
organizations submit sufficient information to enable university officials an 
orderly means of allocating facilities. It may oblige the speaker to assume full 
41. First quotation is from Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). Second 
quotation is from West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). See also 
dicta on academic freedom in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) and dis-
cussion in text infra, regarding the same problem with respect to discrimination among 
guest speakers on campus. 
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responsibility for any violation of law involved in his own conduct. It 
probably may require a statement that the views presented are not necessarily 
those of the institution or of the sponsoring group. But it may neither pro-
ceed by rules that are vague or that reserve unchecked discretion to censor, 
nor may it screen speakers according to their political affiliation, their sub-
ject matter, or their point of view. Nor will the answer be allowed that 
speakers can be banned without violating anyone's freedom to hear on the 
ground that the college's own faculty already adequately considers all points 
of view in class. As Mill pointed out: 42 
Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from 
his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by 
what they offer as refutation. That is not the way to do justice to 
the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind. 
He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; 
who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them. He 
must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form; he must 
feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject 
has to encounter and dispose of; else he will never possess himself of 
the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty. 
Recent case illustrations of these conclusions are at hand. A 1965 North 
Carolina statute requiring the trustees of the consolidated state university 
system to adopt special rules governing the appearance of "known members 
of the Communist Party" was declared void for vagueness by a federal court 
only this year.43 Similarly, a rule permitting use of a college auditorium by 
outside organizations "insofar as these are determined to be compatible with 
the aims of Hunter College as a public institution of higher learning," was 
held to be void for vagueness.44 
Even where the regulation may be clear, it may deny equal protection 
where it bars speakers according to their political affiliation, the popularity 
of their views, or some other standard that goes to the background of the 
speaker rather than the legality of the manner in which he proposes to speak. 
42. J. S. MILL, supra note 40, at 47. 
43. Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968). There are additional 
holdings of considerable importance that do not appear in the opinion but which are 
implicit in the court's disposition of the case. In reaching the merits and holding in favor 
of the plaintiffs, the court necessarily held (a) that the students and speakers had standing, 
(b) that the issue had not become moot merely because the particular date for which the 
speakers had been scheduled had passed, (c) that the abstention doctrine did not apply. 
All of these issues were tendered by defendants' various motions to dismiss. The treat-
ment of these issues appears to have been correct. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 88 S. Ct. 391 
(1968); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (addressee of mail has standing 
to contest conditions imposed on mail); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (ab-
stention held inappropriate); East Meadow Community Concerts Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 
19 N.Y.2d 605, 278 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1967) (action for declaratory judgment not moot where 
court has jurisdiction, dispute of recurring nature, parties adverse, free speech the issue, 
and rule challenged on its face). 
44. Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962). 
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Thus, the California Supreme Court has struck down a ban against "sub-
versive elements" on grounds of equal protection (rather than on vagueness 
alone):45 
It is true that the state need not open the doors of a school building as 
a forum and may at any time choose to close them. Once it opens the 
doors, however, it cannot demand tickets of admission in the form of 
convictions and affiliations that it deems acceptable: 
The New York and California courts were, in this regard, merely following 
standards established years earlier by the United States Supreme Court:46 
The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to 
be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is 
held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but 
whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of 
speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have 
committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a 
conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted 
for their conspiracy or other violation of valid laws. But it is a different 
matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, 
seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful 
public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge. 
On the same analysis precisely, speaker bans in Mississippi and Louisiana were 
recendy set asideP 
Again, however, the Constitution has been interpreted as requiring no 
more than professional associations have themselves recommended. The 
Joint Statement provides in this respect: 
Students should be allowed to invite and to hear any person of 
their own choosing. Those routine procedures required by an institu-
tion before a guest speaker is invited to appear on campus should be 
designed only to insure that there is orderly scheduling of facilities and 
adequate preparation for the event, and that the occasion is conducted 
in a manner appropriate to an academic community. The institutional 
45. Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885, 892 (1946). 
Same ground used as alternative holding in Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 
924 (Sup. Ct. 1962). 
46. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937). 
47. See Stacy v. Williams, Cause No. WC 6725 (N.D. Miss., June 30, 1967) (temporary 
restraining order issued July 7, 1967). (The statute is discussed in Comment, Mississippi's 
Campus Speaker Ban: Constitutional Considerations and the Academic Freedom of Students, 
38 MISS. L. REv. 488 (1967)). Student Liberal Federation v. Louisiana State Univ. at New 
Orleans, Civ. Action No. 68-300 (E.D. La., Feb. 13, 1968) (temporary restraining order 
issued Feb. 15, 1968, Heebe, J.). (The statute is discussed in Note, State's Right To Abro-
gate First Amendment Guarantees in Regulation of State University Speaker Programs, 42 
TULANE L. REv. 394 (1968)). For cases ruling against litigants seeking to ban speakers on 
campus see Cannon v. Towner, 138 Misc. 955, 70 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Egan v. 
Moore, 20 App. Div. 2d 150, 245 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1963), afj'd, 14 N.Y.2d 775, 199 N.E.2d 842, 
250 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1964); Donato v. Board of Educ., N.Y. Sup. Ct., Weschester Co., Jan. 30, 
1967. 
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control of campus facilities should not be used as a device of censor-
ship. It should be made clear to the academic and larger community 
that sponsorship of guest speakers does not necessarily imply approval 
or endorsement of the views expressed, either by the sponsoring group 
or the institutions. 
In closing this brief article, I want to emphasize again that we have been 
discussing judicial trends rather than legal certainties. The Supreme Court 
has not definitely considered the scope of student political freedom on 
campus or the scope of student procedural due process, and a number of 
state courts as well as some federal courts would not necessarily reach the 
results reported in this article. Nonetheless, it is correct to state that a trend 
is evident, and I believe it to be a fair prophecy that the trend will continue. 
I should hope, however, that the abrasive last resort of unwelcome litigation 
may be avoided and that the principles we have discussed will gather volun-
tary support on the basis that they reflect sound and enlightened educational 
policy. Wholly apart from the legal compulsion which may support them, 
these principles are surely no more than those that self-respecting institutions 
of higher learning should freely desire to secure as worthwhile in themselves. 
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APPENDIX 
THE JOINT STATEMENT ON RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF STUDENTS provides in part: 
B. Investigation of Student Conduct. 
(1). Except under extreme emergency circumstances, premises occupied by students 
and the personal possessions of students should not be searched unless appropriate 
authorization has been obtained. For premises such as residence halls controlled by the 
institution, an appropriate and responsible authority should be designated to whom 
application should be made before a search is conducted. The application should specify 
the reasons for the search and the objects or information sought. The student should 
be present, if possible, during the search. For premises not controlled by the institution, 
the ordinary requirements for lawful search should be followed. 
(2). Students detected or arrested in the course of serious violations of institutional 
regulations, or infractions of ordinary law, should be informed of their rights. No form 
of harassment should be used by institutional representatives to coerce admissions of 
guilt or information about conduct of other suspected persons. 
C. Status of Student Pending Final Action. Pending action on the charges, the status of 
a student should not be altered, or his right to be present on the campus and to at· 
tend classes suspended, except for reasons relating to his physical or emotional safety 
and well-being, or for reasons relating to the safety and well-being of students, faculty, 
or university property. 
D. Hearing Committee Procedures. When the misconduct may result in serious penalties 
and if the student questions the fairness of disciplinary action taken against him, he 
should be granted, on request, the privilege of a hearing before a regularly constituted 
hearing committee. The following suggested hearing committee procedures satisfy the 
requirements of procedural due process in situations requiring a high degree of 
formality: 
(1). The hearing committee should include faculty members or students, or, if 
regularly included or requested by the accused, both faculty and student members. No 
member of the hearing committee who is otherwise interested in the particular case 
should sit in judgment during the proceeding. 
(2). The student should be informed, in writing, of the reasons for the proposed 
disciplinary action with sufficient particularity, and in sufficient time, to insure oppor-
tunity to prepare for the hearing. 
(3). The student appearing before the hearing committee should have the right to 
be assisted in his defense by an adviser of his choice. 
(4). The burden of proof should rest upon the officials bringing the charge. 
(5). The student should be given an opportunity to testify and to present evidence 
and witnesses. He should have an opportunity to hear and question adverse witnesses. 
In no case should the committee consider statements against him unless he has been 
advised of their content and of the names of those who made them, and unless he has 
been given an opportunity to rebut unfavorable inferences which might otherwise be 
drawn. · 
(6). All matters upon which the decision may be based must be introduced into 
evidence at the proceeding before the hearing committee. The decision should be based 
solely upon such matter. Improperly acquired evidence should not be admitted. 
(7). In the absence of a transcript, there should be both a digest and a verbatim 
record, such as a tape recording, of the hearing. 
(8). The decision of the hearing committee should be final, subject only to the 
student's right of appeal to the President or ultimately to the governing board of the 
institution. 
